The Strategy of Conflict by Thomas Schelling: Chapter 3 (Part II)

If Schelling gave us a background of how a threat works and how a threat may fail then in this second part he will elaborate more on the critical parts of a threat of a State or a threatener. 

This is very interesting to look at. First, he explained how a Chance (unexpected events) may reinforce a threat of a State. He also argued that the existence of a chance in a threat may leave States into question: how will they act according to circumstances? Obviously, it was assumed that these States are very careful at their actions however a single action of theirs may lead to unexpected consequences.

Now we move into the next part which is about a Limited War. A limited war according to Schelling is simply a type of action that may inhibit an all-out or general war such as arms race, retaliation, etc. To put it in a layman's term, a limited war is like that starting point of a war. Again, he emphasized that States try their best to avoid an all-out war but Schelling also argued that a limited war is more applicable to certain circumstances than all-out war. Why? he stated two reasons: First, is that limited war is more applicable to many situations because it only threatens the enemy about an all-out war (although he also clarified that the State doesn't have any intention of acting upon it) and second is that it is more threatening because given that the enemy can't predict the preferences and actions of the State, the State can certainly move according to its planned rhythm.

In the next subsection, he elaborated more on the risk of a limited war and he argued that in order for a threat to work, one has to act little by little or threaten the enemy through little actions that may lead to massive effects. A threat may cost both sides but it will cost more damage to the other party if succeeds. Under Chances, a threat may be reinforced that will lead people to think that an action of a State is out of control. This may therefore become a genuine threat to the enemy.

Next, is about harassment and reprisals. It's more of like a strategy according Schelling that may inhibit war among the two States. This is more of a deterrence technique that uses a single act of violence to threaten the enemy. Brinkmanship is another thing related to this subsection. It is a form of harassment technique done by States (probably this was analyzed during the Cold War period). 

Lastly, is about imperfect decisions. This topic doesn't only apply to governments but it also apply to people in general, and Schelling mentioned this in his book! He said that a decision-maker is not a perfect person; he is inclined to emotions and other personal factors that would hinder him to make perfect decisions. He also argued that a representative is called depending on a certain problem in a country. However, that representative can't decide or may clash his decisions with his authorities. Thus, firm decisions doesn't exist really according to him. 


Definitely intuitive but at the same time critical. This chapter doesn't talk too much about Math (since Game Theory is about Math) but this talks more about few factors that may change the course of actions. Generally speaking, this chapter talks more about deterrence and what are the strategies that may deter a particular situation. So, if you're an international relations major and want to look at a different perspective of what Game Theory is like then definitely get this book! 



Phew! that's all folks for today. I hope you've enjoyed this review. Have a nice day ahead and look forward for more analysis of Game Theory coming from Me!