The Strategy of Conflict by Thomas Schelling: Chapter 3

Schelling's analysis on promises and threats using Game Theory is another interesting perspective to look at. In this chapter, he started with an introduction of how zero-sum game works and further added an unique ingredient to it which is "randomization". 

By using the game matrix, he illustrated the probabilities of behavioral changes of two players given that there is a threat. In this case, he explained through the matrix the possible and expected strategies of each player and the outcomes of each actions. He also explained the predicted outcomes if one player seeks to threaten the other player. He also added the possible changes in a strategy given the possibility that a threat might fail.

In this chapter, he also elaborated about randomization of strategies and how it will benefit or worsen the player. He explained that the cost may be reduced if there is randomization in a player's choices/strategy.

Another part is where he further elaborated the game scenario of fractional commitments and promises although this part doesn't seem to satisfy my comprehension. But on the side note, I think that Schelling has very well explained the outcomes behind a player who promises and a player who threatens.  

Overall, this chapter made me think that the strategies of each player is not only enclosed in a box. Instead, their strategies may subject to changes given the circumstances. 

Another one I would like to point out here is the importance of communicating a player's threat to the other player. It was a comprehensive explanation coming from an important figure of Game Theory analyses.

In the next part of this chapter, he will explain more about Changes and I hope to look forward to it and more about this awesome man. His analyses is  something good to look at in an International Relations analyst's study.  



So look forward more about this in my next review~